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We analyze how an artist’s death influences the market prices of her works of art. Death has 
two opposing effects on art prices. By irrevocably restricting the artist’s oeuvre, prices, ceteris 
paribus, increase when the artist dies. On the other hand, an untimely death may well frustrate 
the collectors’ hopes of owning artwork that will, as the artist’s career progresses, become 
generally known and appreciated. By frustrating expected future name recognition, death 
impacts negatively on art prices. In conjunction, these two channels of influence give rise to a 
hump-shaped relationship between age at death and death-induced price changes. Using 
transactions from fine art auctions, we show that the empirically identified death effects 
indeed conform to our theoretical predictions. We derive our results from hedonic art price 
regressions, making use of a data set which exceeds the sample size of traditional studies in 
cultural economics by an order of magnitude. 
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REPUTATION, PRICE, AND DEATH: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ART PRICE FORMATION 
 
1. Introduction  
Art prices are often claimed to substantially increase when the artist dies. These claims appear to be 
largely based on anecdotal evidence. They are promulgated by hearsay and sometimes cleverly 
insinuated by art dealers who attempt to convince naïve customers that it is justified to mark up the 
artwork of recently deceased artists. This study provides a theory-guided empirical analysis of the so-
called “death effect” on art prices. The analysis employs hedonic price regressions and makes use of a 
dataset which exceeds the sample size of traditional studies in cultural economics by an order of 
magnitude, thereby shedding a new light on previous investigations of art price formation. 
Even though the literature on art auctions, art price indices, and rates of return in the visual arts market 
is by now quite voluminous (see, repectively, Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2006, Ginsburgh, Mei and 
Moses, 2006, and Frey and Eichenberger, 1995), the death effect has not received much attention so 
far. To be sure, there are a few empirical studies which allow for a death effect, but these studies do so 
in a rather cursory and off-handed manner by merely including in their regressions a dummy variable 
that distinguishes between works of art created by living and late artists (see, for example, Agnello, 
2002, and Worthington and Higgs, 2006).  
The first investigation that has squarely addressed death-induced art price changes is Ekelund, Ressler 
and Watson (2000). These authors go some way in providing a theoretical underpinning of the death 
effect by pointing out that artists produce durable goods under market conditions of monopolistic 
competition. Thus, given rational actors in the art market, the Coase Conjecture applies (Coase, 1972): 
even though artists have, in principle, some discretion in setting prices, they cannot exert market 
power because they are unable to credibly commit to not lowering their prices in the future by spoiling 
the market with an inflationary increase in production. During an artist’s lifetime, prices will therefore 
settle well below the monopoly price. Death, of course, is the ultimate device to commit to 
discontinuing production. Art prices thus increase when the artist dies because her oeuvre all of a 
sudden becomes scarcer than originally anticipated. After having laid this theoretical foundation, 
Ekelund, Ressler and Watson proceed to empirically identify the death effect with the help of a 
hedonic price regression. Their data consists of a panel of auction records relating to the work of 21 
Latin American artists who died near or during the observation period (1977-1996). The prices are 
shown to peak in the years immediately following an artist’s death, thus lending support to the 
existence of a death effect.  
From a theoretical point of view, the main concern with this pioneering analysis relates to the artists’ 
age at death. Since the probability of dying increases with age, the information of an old artist’s death 
is not very surprising and should therefore already be largely reflected in the price, implying a small   2
death effect. The death of an old artist, moreover, causes a relatively small reduction in the anticipated 
size of her oeuvre which, again, translates into a relatively small price increase when her death is made 
public. Assuming rational expectations, one would therefore expect the death effect to decrease with 
the artist’s age at death. A formal rendering of this argument is to be found in Itaya and Ursprung 
(2008) who investigate the death effect in an infinite-horizon dynamic general equilibrium setting. It 
therefore stands to reason that the death effect depends on the age at death. Neglecting this relationship 
in empirical investigations may, of course, give rise to a seriously misspecified econometric model.  
A recent study by Maddison and Jul-Perdersen (2007) acknowledges that the prices of an artist’s 
works should depend on the expected total supply which, in turn, depends on the artist’s conditional 
life expectancy at the time of sale. Using a data set comprising auction prices of oil paintings by 
Danish artists who died during the period 1983-2003, Maddison and Jul-Perdersen show that the 
variable “conditional life expectancy” (which, by definition, assumes the value of zero for artists who 
are not alive anymore at the time of sale) has a significant negative effect on art prices in their hedonic 
fixed-effects panel regression, while the dummy variable indicating whether the artist was dead or 
alive at the time of sale does not appear to have an independent significant influence. These results are 
compatible with a positive death effect that decreases with the age at death.  
Our empirical strategy is to identify the relationship between the death effect and the artists’ age at 
death more directly. We also employ hedonic fixed-effect panel regressions which however include a 
polynomial of the age at death to explain the prices of those pieces of art whose creators have died 
shortly before the respective transaction has taken place. Our dataset comprises a selection of 436,308 
transactions extracted from Hislop’s Art Sale Index (1980-2005). It is thus much larger than the 
datasets used so far in empirical studies of art price formation.
1 In any event, it is sufficiently large to 
estimate the influence of low-impact determinants even for relatively small price segments of the art 
market with the help of quantile regressions.  
Our empirical analysis is guided by theoretical considerations. Since reputation plays a major role in 
the arts market (cf. Beckert and Rössel, 2004), we analyze a durable goods monopoly model which 
encompasses reputation-induced demand. Our main result shows that the relationship between the 
death effect and the artists’ age at death is inversely u-shaped: the death of young artists actually 
decreases the price of their works of art, whereas the death effect is positive for older artists and 
disappears for artist’s who die at a very old age. This pattern perfectly matches our predictions. The 
negative price effect of untimely deaths, which has not been considered in the literature so far, is a 
straight forward consequence of reputation-induced demand for works of fine art. The basic 
mechanism works as follows. At the beginning of their careers, artists have no far-reaching reputation 
to speak of. Nevertheless, collectors who happen to be familiar with the work of promising young 
                                                 
1 To provide a reference point, we report here the number of observations of the studies cited above: 630 
(Ekelund et al., 2000), 4857 (Maddison and Jul-Pederssen, 2007), 25,217 (Agnello, 2002), and 30,227 
(Worthington and Higgs, 2006).   3
artists might well pay a considerable price for their works of art since they expect these artists to 
eventually obtain a reputation that justifies the price they pay for the fledgling’s work. If such an artist 
dies an untimely death, her lifetime oeuvre might not be sufficiently substantial to generate the 
expected reputation, and the price drops. There are thus two mechanisms determining the death effect: 
the standard positive effect deriving from unexpected scarcity of supply and a negative effect deriving 
from frustrated demand-side expectations of artistic reputation. Both effects disappear for artist’s who 
die at a ripe old age. In conjunction, the scarcity and the reputation effect give rise to the identified 
inversely u-shaped relationship between death-related price changes and age at death.  
In deriving this relationship, we follow a minimalist modelling strategy, i.e. we only portray those 
stylized facts of the art market that are absolutely necessary to arrive at the empirically identified price 
pattern. In particular, we do not replicate the approach employed by Itaya and Ursprung (2008) who 
derive optimal consumption and production paths for the collectors and artists, albeit without 
considering reputation-induced utility on the part of the collectors. We rather proceed directly from a 
postulated market demand function and assume that the artists’ flow production is constant over career 
time and homogenous. This portrait of the production process is admittedly quite stark: the optimal 
production path derived in the study by Itaya and Ursprung (2008) suggests, for example, that 
production declines over an artist’s career time, and various empirical studies indicate that some 
artists’ early work is most highly appreciated, whereas others produce their most successful work at a 
more mature age (see, for example, Galenson and Weinberg, 2000 and 2001, and Edwards, 2004). All 
of these idiosyncrasies of artistic production do however not affect the qualitative conclusions of our 
main argument. To minimize nomenclature, we therefore chose to associate an artist’s stock of 
finished works of art with his or her career age by assuming a constant flow production of 
homogenous works of art. We also assume an efficient arts market which presupposes well 
functioning institutions. Again, in an attempt to arrive at a minimalist model, we chose not to portray 
the respective institutional details. We simply assume that the established modern gallery system, as it 
developed after WWII, is able to match the collectors’ demand with the supply in a frictionless 
manner. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Our minimalist model is developed in Section 2. In Section 3 we present 
the empirical methodology and our dataset. The estimates with respect to the variables that have 
traditionally been used in hedonic art price regressions are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we turn 
to our estimates of the death effect. We first show OLS estimates based on our full sample of auction 
records. In a second step, we then reduce the sample size in order to be able to estimate quantile 
regressions which serve, on the one hand, as a robustness test of our OLS estimates. On the other 
hand, these quantile regressions also shed some new light on art price formation in the middle and 
high-end segment of the art market. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. A minimalist model 
Consider the oeuvre of a deceased artist.  The price of her artwork varies positively with the quality as 
perceived by the contemporary collectors and, according to the law of demand, with scarcity. We 
capture these determinants with a standard downward-sloping demand function D(X), where X 
denotes the size of the artist’s lifetime oeuvre. The art price also depends on the artist’s reputation. To 
gain a reputation in the global art scene, an artist’s work needs to be well known to a large audience 
which implies that reputation, ceteris paribus, increases with the size X of the oeuvre.
2 Let the 
increasing function R(X) describe the impact of reputation on the art price and let the “estate” price be 
defined as Pe(X) = D(X) + R(X). It can safely be assumed that the reputation effect R(X) dominates 
the scarcity effect D(X) for sufficiently small oeuvres, implying that Pe(X) is initially increasing in X. 
For large lifetime D(X) oeuvres X, the scarcity effect may take over to give rise to a single peaked 
demand function.  
The following specification serves as an illustration. Let D(X)=a-bX, and R(X)=rX for X< ˆ X  and 
R(X)=r ˆ X  for X ˆ X ≥ , where r>b.  We thus assume that reputation increases with X as long as the 
oeuvre X falls short of the critical size ˆ X . The parameters a, b and r capture the quality of the artist’s 
work, the price-sensitivity of scarcity, and the price-sensitivity of reputation. The resulting estate price 
equation has the following appearance: 
(1)  e
ˆ a( br ) X , f o r XX
P( X )
ˆˆ ar Xb X , f o r XX
⎧ −− < ⎪ = ⎨
+− ≥ ⎪ ⎩
  
In order to determine the price of the works of art of a living artist, we assume that the collectors are 
perfectly rational and risk neutral; to be more precise, they are at each point of time willing to pay a 
price that is consistent with the price that is expected to prevail in the long run when (as the art lover 
John Maynard Keynes pointed out in a different context) the artist will be dead and the estate price as 
given in equation (1) applies. In period (year) t, a living artist’s work thus commands the price  
(2) 
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∑∑ ∏   ,          
where mk denotes the mortality rate, i.e. the probability of dying at the end of year k, and xk the artistic 
output in year k. In the simplest possible model of artistic production, output is constant over career 
time, i.e. xk=1 for  tkt ≤≤and xk=0 otherwise, where  t  marks the beginning of the artist’s career,  t  
                                                 
2 The assumption that reputation varies positively with the size of the oeuvre, or, alternatively, with career age, is 
supported by the empirical evidence provided by Beckert and Rössel (2004).   5
the retirement age, and output is normalized to unity. Assuming constant production has the advantage 





= ∑ can be expressed by her (career) age. 
Using a numerical specification of the estate price equation (1) and mortality rates from a real world 
life table, the period art prices P(t) can easily be computed from equation (2).
3 We assume in our 
example that the artists’ careers begin at age t2 0 = , that they retire at age  t8 9 =  (the last age for 
which reliable mortality rates are available), and that reputation reaches the maximum level after 50 
years of productive life (i.e. ˆ X5 0 = , or, alternatively,ˆ t =70). Furthermore, we assume a=10, b=0.1 and 
r=0.2. The resulting period prices P(t) are depiced in the first panel of Figure 1 together with the estate 
prices  e P (t) , where  e P (t) is the price that prevails after the artist’s death at age t. The second panel 
depicts the death effect ∆(t), expressed as the percentage change in the art price if the artist dies at age 
t: ∆(t)=[Pe(t)-P(t)]/P(t). 
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In our example the death effect is negative for artists who die before they reach the age of 60, and it is 
positive for artists who die at a greater age. Using the additive structure of our price equation (1), the 
death effect can easily be decomposed into its two component parts, the reputation effect and the 
scarcity effect. If art prices were exclusively determined via expected reputation, i.e. if Pe(X)=R(X), 
the death effect ∆R(t) would be negative and decreasing (in absolute values) up to the critical age at 
which the artist’s reputation reaches the maximum level (in our example at the age of 70). If the artist 
dies at a greater age, no reputation-related death effect occurs (see Figure 2). On the other hand, if 
reputation played no role and art prices depended only on expected scarcity, i.e. if Pe(X)=D(X), the 
death effect ∆D(t) would be positive and decreasing up to the age at which the artist stops producing 
                                                 
3 We used the period life tables published by the German Office for Statistics. The mortality rates apply to males 
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(in our example at 89). Adding up the reputation and scarcity-related death effects yields the total 
effect ∆(t). 

































We now turn to analyzing the relationship between the quality of an artist’s work and the size of the 
death effect. To do so, we proceed from two straightforward assumptions concerning the two 
components of our estate price equation (1). We begin with the function D(X). Since the work of 
outstanding artists is, almost by definition, very special, these artists can truly be considered to 
produce under conditions of monopolistic competition. Less innovative artists, on the other hand, 
produce artwork that belongs to a specific genre, but is not distinguished by any idiosyncratic creative 
idea that sets it apart from the production of close competitors. These artists bear a resemblance to 
mere artisans who produce under market conditions of perfect competition. Prices for artwork created 
by top artists are thus not only higher than prices for works of art of lesser quality, price sensitivity is 
also larger. In terms of D(X) this means that the parameters a and b both vary positively with artistic 
quality.  
The reputation-induced price component R(X) which portrays the influence of reputation depends on 
artistic quality as well. Reputation is, after all, directly related to an artist’s ability to create truly 
original works of art. The more novel and ingenious an artist’s work is, the more there is to be 
discovered, the more information about her work can be exchanged and transmitted by the key players 
and institutions that make up the global art market. It is evident that this reputation-generating 
mechanism can only properly work if the there is a sufficiently large oeuvre to be promulgated; this is 
why reputation increases as the artist’s oeuvre grows. More important for gaining a sustainable 
reputation is, however, that the artist’s work is sufficiently rich in scope to sustain an ongoing 




extent to which an increase in the size of an artist’s oeuvre X translates into a gain of reputation R, 
thus varies positively with the artist’s ability to create outstanding works of art, i.e. dR/dX≡r increases 
with artistic quality.  
We sum up by concluding that the parameters a, b and r of our estate price equation (1) vary positively 
with artistic quality. Since the incline of the upward-sloping part of Pe(X) depends on the difference b-
r, it is not a priori clear whether better artists face steeper or flatter demand curves in the beginning of 
their careers than their less accomplished colleagues. This ambiguity is however due to our linear 
specification. A more realistic portrait would assume concave functions D(X) and R(X). Concavity 
would imply that changes in R(X) translate directly into changes of Pe(X) for small values of X since 
the slope of D(X) is close to zero at X=0. We therefore assume that higher artistic quality gives rise to 
steeper demand curves as illustrated in the first panel of Figure 3.
4 The second panel of Figure 3 shows 
how these differences in artistic quality translate into percentage price changes when the artist dies. 
This panel also neatly summarizes the five hypotheses that are empirically tested in the remainder of 
this study.   
       
Figure 3.1


























































Hypothesis 1: The death effect is a statistically significant phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 2: If an artist dies at a relatively young age, the price of her works of art decrease on 
impact; the price increases however on impact if the artist is lucky enough to live a full life. In other 
words, for artists dying at a young age, the death effect is dominated by the reputation effect, whereas 
for artists who die at an old age, the scarcity effect dominates. 
                                                 
4 The bold curve which describes the demand faced by a representative accomplished artist is the one we have 
used above: DA(X)=10-0.1(t-20), RA(X)=0.2(t-20). Multiplying the intercept and the slopes by 2 (½) and then 
augmenting (diminishing) the absolute value of the slope by 25% yields the demand curve faced by top-artists 
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Hypothesis 3: The relationship between the death effect and the age at death is inversely U-shaped. 
Hypothesis 4:  The absolute values of the death-induced price changes vary positively with the quality 
of the deceased artist’s work. Since high artistic quality – which we cannot directly observe - gives 
rise to high prices, this hypothesis implies that the death effect is, ceteris paribus, largest (in absolute 
values) for artwork fetching high prices. 
In focussing our model on the death effect we did not mean to imply that this effect represents a 
foremost determinant of art price formation. We focussed on the death effect simply because it has 
hitherto been neglected in the relevant literature, and we readily acknowledge that we are dealing here 
with a very particular phenomenon by adding 
Hypothesis 5: Art prices are determined by many factors. Even though one of the most important 
determinants, artistic quality, is hard to quantify if resorting to the market price is ruled out, many 
observable factors such as size, medium, genre, time of sale, etc. do have a significant and systematic 
influence on art price formation.  
 
3. Methodology and Dataset 
We test the hypotheses derived in the previous section with the help of hedonic price regressions of 
the following type: 
(3) 
ms




=α+ β + γ +δ +θ +ε ∑∑ ,        
 where pit is the real price of artwork i (in 1982 US dollars) sold at time t. The art price is determined 
by a constant, time-invariant idiosyncratic characteristics xil [size, medium, etc.], time-varying 
characteristics yitr [auction house, the flow-supply of the artist's work in a particular year, the artist's 
state of being alive or dead etc.], artist dummies δj [Picasso, Pollock, Warhol, etc.] capturing the 
artists’ abilities and reputation, and time dummies θt which allow to estimate the influence of the 
overall art price movement on the price of a specific work of art. These time dummies can also be used 
to construct a price index for a standardized piece of art. Given the semi-logarithmic specification of 
our estimation equation (3), the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is straight forward. 
Percentage changes in the estimated price, given a unit change in, for example, an explanatory variable 
xl, can be calculated as ˆ pe x p ()1 ∆ =β − l .
5 
The time-dependent variables are of crucial importance for a study investigating the dynamics of art 
price formation. A first set of time-dependent variables refer to the time when the artwork was created. 
The date of creation is important because it contains some information about the artwork’s genre and 
                                                 
5 This transformation applies since all of our explanatory variables assume discrete values. For continuous 
variables, the percentage change in the price would be directly reflected by the estimated coefficient.   9
style which might or might not agree with the contemporary collectors’ tastes. Decade dummies seem 
to be appropriate to capture the style and genre of an artwork. A second set of time-dependent 
variables is needed to portray the general economic condition and the art market environment at the 
time of the auction. The boom in the art market in the early 1990 has, for example, been attributed to 
the bullish stock markets in Japan during that time. We control for changes in the macroeconomic 
conditions by including “year of sale” variables. A third time-dependent variable that on might want to 
include is the artist’s age at the time of sale or, if the artist is not alive anymore, the length of her life, 
which, according to our model, can serve as a proxy for the artist’s reputation as well as for the 
scarcity of her oeuvre. Since we include artist-specific dummies, the influence of the length of 
(productive) life cannot be independently estimated for late artists. For artists who are still alive or 
have died during our observation period (1980-2005), the age at the time of sale can in principle be 
included as an explaining variable, at least for those artists whose work has be sold repeatedly during 
our observation period. Since, however, the maximum time span of 26 years is rather short, we have 
decided not to use this variable in our preferred specification of the regression. We have, however, run 
regressions with the artists’ age at the time of sale as an explanatory variable. Including this variable 
has no perceptible influence on our estimates. 
It has been argued that an artist’s age at the time of creation is related to artistic quality (see Galenson 
and Weinberg, 2000 and 2001, and Edwards, 2004). One may therefore think that this age should also 
be included in the regression as an explaining variable. Since, however, the life-cycle creativity 
patterns are quite diverse, one cannot estimate a common pattern; and classifying hundreds of artists 
according to whether they have bloomed early in their careers or late, does not appear to be a viable 
empirical strategy.
6   
To identify the death effect, we make the following distinction:  
i. Living artists: if a piece of art created by a living artist is sold, the mean price for her works of art is 
picked up by the   artist’s dummy variable δj.  
ii. Recently deceased artists: if a piece of art created by a recently deceased artist is sold, the price 
incorporates the death effect. To capture the death effect, we introduce the 0-1 dummy variable Death, 
which equals unity if the recently deceased artist’s work is sold either in year T in which the artist 
died, in year T+1, or in year T+2. We have chosen this rather broad time span for two reasons: First, 
we don't know in which month an artist died. If an artist dies after the fall auctions, the death effect 
can only be noticed in the following year. Moreover, works of art of some artists are not auctioned 
each year. To be on the safe side we therefore allow for an additional year for the death effect to be 
noticed at an auction. Since our theory predicts the death effect to depend on the artists age at death we 
interact the Death variable with the variable Dage (age at death = death year – birth year) to arrive at 
                                                 
6 Galenson’s claim that the life-cycle creativity patterns depend on the artist’s production technique has been 
controversially discussed in the literature (see, for example, Ginsburgh and Weyers, 2006).   10
the crucial variable D-Dage. By estimating polynomials of D-Dage of degree three, four and five we 
are able to identify the sought-after death-effect profiles.  
iii. Deceased artists: We control for the evolution of prices beyond the year T+2 by including the 
explanatory variable TSD which measures the time passed since the artist died. TSD is zero up to T+2. 
The smallest positive value TSD can assume is thus 3. This specification assumes that prices evolve in 
a linear manner for a substantial time after an artist’s death. We expect TSD to have a negative 
influence on prices since dead artists are no longer able to accommodate to the collectors’ ever 
changing tastes. 
Before turning to the estimation results, some comments on the employed estimation techniques are 
called for.    We estimate equation (3) by OLS and quantile regressions. The reason for using these 
two approaches is the following. On the one hand, OLS is computationally less burdensome, which is 
- given the size of our dataset - clearly an advantage. On the other hand, OLS regressions are 
vulnerable to outliers, which is a severe drawback since art prices are very heterogeneous. Quantile 
regressions (cf. Koenker and Bassett, 1978, and Koenker and Hallock, 2000) are less likely to be 
influenced by extreme outliers since this method minimizes absolute deviations instead of squared 
deviations. Further advantages of quantile regressions include that they are likely to be more efficient 
in cases of heteroscedastic data and that one obtains a more differentiated picture of the analyzed price 
mechanisms.  
Our “full” dataset is a selection from Hislop's Art Sales Index (CD-ROM 2005). This database 
contains art prices for oil paintings, works on paper, prints, sculptures, miniatures and photographs, all 
collected worldwide from public auctions between 1980 and 2005. From this sample we extracted a 
sub-sample of 436,308 transaction records for our OLS regressions. We applied five selection criteria:  
(1) the artwork is a print, a work on paper, or an oil painting; (2) the artwork was sold in the US, 
Japan, or Western Europe; (3) the birth year and, in case of a deceased artist, the death year are 
known; (4) the year of creation of the artwork is after 1873 and known;
7 (5) height and width of the 
artwork are known.  
Computational limitations forced us to further restrict the sample size for our quantile regressions. To 
arrive at a manageable sample size we deleted all minor artists, defined as those artists whose works of 
art were auctioned less than 250 times in the sample period 1980-2005. Applying this admittedly 
arbitrary rule significantly reduces the number of artist from 25,204 to 262 [thus reducing the number 
of artist dummies], while preserving a relatively large number of observations (146,575).   
A detailed description of the employed variables and summary statistics for both datasets are reported 
in the Appendix.  
 
                                                 
7 This year was chosen since it roughly marks the beginning of impressionism.   11
 
4. First results  
In Table 1 we report the results of three OLS regressions of equation (3). The death effect is estimated 
by a third-order polynomial of the variable D-Dage. Estimates of higher-order polynomials are 
discussed below. The first column reports the results using our full data set. Since our auction records 
cover the period 1980-2005, the estimated death effects relate to artists who died during this period. 
The second regression is based on a sub-sample of the full dataset which excludes works of art by 
artists who were already dead by 1980. The third regression only considers works of art by artists who 
died between 1980 and 2005.  
Before elaborating on the estimated death effects in the following section, we discuss here the 
estimates of the other coefficients.  
   i.  Medium: It is well known that different types of artwork fetch different prices. Our results 
confirm this. Oil on canvas yields the highest prices (+410% as compared to prints), followed by 
drawings on paper (+80%) and prints.  
   ii. Size: We allow for different size effects for oil paintings, drawings on paper, and prints. We make 
this distinction since large prints are an exception, whereas artists sometimes create extraordinary 
large paintings and drawings. Our estimates confirm our conjecture that size effects differ across the 
three media. For prints we find a stable linear relationship between size and price. An increase in 
height (width) by 10cm raises the price of a print by about 7.2% (3.9%). For oil paintings and 
drawings on paper, the estimates of the squared regressors become significant. Prices of “reasonably” 
sized pictures vary positively with size. As one would expect, prices do, however, decline beyond a 
critical size. This critical size appears to be determined by wall sizes in ordinary collectors’ homes. 
Paintings and drawings exceeding these dimensions are mainly bought by museums, whose demand is 
limited. To be more specific: prices of oil paintings increase up to a size of roughly 2.5×4m (height × 
width), but decline for larger dimensions. The same holds for works on paper whose optimal size in 
terms of revenue is 3.2 × 3.8m.  
  iii. Signature: A signature is a sign of authenticity. As expected, prices increase by roughly +27% if 
a work of art is signed. Our estimate is thus in line with the commonly held belief, but contradicts the 
finding by Czujack (1997) who cannot detect any positive influence of a signature on the price of 
Picasso’s works of art. We will return to this issue in the next section when we elaborate on the 
estimates of our quantile regressions.   12
Table 1: OLS regressions, 3
rd-ordere polynomial of D-Dage  
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    1.6200***  
  1.0107*** 
−0.1859*** 
  0.8034*** 
−0.0999*** 
  0.7995*** 
  1.1532*** 
−0.1621*** 
  0.9817***  
−0.1088*** 
  0.4751*** 
  0.3890***  
  0.0603*** 
  0.0007*** 
−0.1407*** 
−0.0190  
  0.4260*** 
  0.3279*** 
  0.5120*** 
  0.1600*** 
−0.1019*** 
  0.4663*** 
  0.1964*** 
  0.4983*** 
  0.0590*** 
  0.3485*** 
  0.0944** 
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  0.7994*** 
  0.8746*** 

















































  1.6745*** 
  0.9892*** 
−0.1463*** 
  0.8804*** 
−0.1060*** 
  0.7117*** 
  1.2826*** 
−0.1808*** 
  1.0548*** 
−0.0832*** 
  0.3669*** 
  0.2845***  
  0.1067*** 
  0.0006*** 
−0.1182*** 
  0.0616  
  0.3848*** 
  0.2557***  
  0.4919*** 
  0.1264*** 
−0.1340*** 
  0.4837*** 
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  0.3221*** 
  0.7155*** 
  0.9952*** 
  1.3579*** 
  1.5223*** 
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  0.8656*** 
  0.8832*** 
  0.8750*** 
  0.8409*** 
  0.9152*** 























































  iv. Supply: One would expect the actual supply of an artist's work (as measured by the number of 
pieces auctioned in the respective year) to decrease the market price of her works of art. This 
expectation is based on the conviction that most collectors are merely interested in owning a 
representative piece of a certain artist rather than a specific piece. Our estimates indeed indicate that an 
additional supply of 10 pieces per year reduces the market price by about 0.5%. Although this effect is 
not very large, it indicates that an unusually large actual supply tends to depress prices, or, vice versa, 
higher prices are fetched in thin markets.  
  v.  Country of Sale and Auction House: The influence of the country of sale and of specific 
salerooms is summarized in Figure 4.  
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  coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant on the 10% (*), 5% (** ), and 1% (***) level.      14
Figure 4: Country of Sale and Auction House (full sample) 
 
 
All percentage price changes reported in Figure 4 are with respect to a work of art sold in Europe, but 
not at Sotheby's or Christie's, and not in London or Paris. Sales at Sotheby's New York [+79%] yield 
higher prices than sales at Sotheby's London [+64%], Sotheby's Paris [+33%], and Sotheby's 
salerooms in the remaining Europe [+15%]. Sales at Sotheby's US excluding New York fetch even 
less [-9%]. Unlike Sotheby's, Christie's auctions achieve higher prices in London [+80%] than in New 
York [+71%], the rest of the US [+50%], Paris [+17%], and the remaining Europe [+7%]. Apart from 
the two predominant auction houses, we find that prices in London [+19%] are higher than in New 
York [+8%] and Paris [+2%], and sales in Japan [+35%] fetch more than sales in Europe and the 
United States [-13%].
8  
vi. Price Index: The hedonic art price index which results from the estimated coefficients of the year-
dummies is depicted in the first panel of Figure 5. Our result is well in line with previous findings 
(see, for example, Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2006). In the year 2005 the art prices reached again the 
level of the last arts market boom in 1990. During the 1990's prices had been rather low and constant.  
                                                 
8 These estimates reconfirm previous results indicating that the law of one price does not hold in the arts market 
(see, for example, Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2006, Pesando, 1993, Pesando and Shum, 1996, and Mei and Moses, 
2002). Notice, however, that the estimated differences may be somewhat biased. Certain auction houses and 
salerooms appear to attracts works of art of superior quality, which increases the average price. Our regressions 
cannot completely control for this influence, because there are, for example, hardly any Picasso paintings sold at 
auction houses not located in Paris, London or New York. The high prices in Japan, moreover, seem to be 
driven, at least to some extent, by peculiarities in the data collection process. Japanese sales appear to be 
underrepresented in Hislop's Art Sales Index and the reported prices are extraordinarily high. We conjecture that 
the Japanese data may be incomplete with respect to the bottom of the distribution.  
   15
 
Figure 5: Hedonic Art Price Index, 1980 -2005, and Creation Period Index, sample 1  
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vii. Genre: The decade in which a work of art has been created is not merely an indicator of age but 
foremost an indicator of contemporary collectors' tastes for certain periods and genres. The estimated 
coefficients of the decade dummy variables thus reveal which periods were en vogue during our 
observation period (1980-2005). The results are summarized in the second panel of Figure 5. Works of 
art from the period 1890-1920 fetch the highest prices. Prices for works from subsequent periods vary 
positively with age; only the most recent batch appears to escape this rule, conceivably because 
contemporary artists are able to produce exactly that kind of art that meets the contemporary 
collectors' tastes.  
All things considered, these results lend strong support to our Hypothesis 5. To be sure, this 
hypothesis is a For our quantile regressions simple restatement of the received wisdom. It is, however, 
worth mentioning again that we have confirmed these results with a dataset that is by an order of 
magnitude larger than the datasets that have hitherto been used in the relevant literature. 
 
 
5. The Death-Effect 
5.1 OLS Regressions 
In this section we discuss the estimation results relating to our hypotheses on the death effect. We 
begin with the results of our OLS regressions. Table 2 reports the estimates of nine different OLS 
regressions. The first set of results corresponds to the estimates already shown in Table 1 (3
rd-order 
polynomials of D-Dage). The estimates of the forth- and fifth-order polynomials of the variable D-
Dage are taken from regressions using the same set of explaining variables.    16
Table 2:Comparison of diﬀerent D-Dage polynomials (OLS)  
 
 
It turns out that the results across all regressions are very similar and confirm the statistical 
significance of the death effect (Hypothesis 1). The fourth-order polynomial is, however, statistically 
somewhat less significant. The adjusted-R² statistics do not differ across the three different 
specifications which leaves us with a difficult choice with respect to the preferred specification. We 
also performed F-tests for the significance of the highest-order term of the polynomials. Even though 
the last terms D-DageP of the fifth-order polynomials is rather small, the F-tests nevertheless indicate 
that these coefficients are statistically different from zero. Since we do not have a preferred 
specification, we show in Figure 6 the respective plots for all nine regressions.  
LNPRICE   3
rd-order polynomials  
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Coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant on the 10% (*), 5% (** ) and 1% (*** ) level.   17
 
Figure 6: Death effect for different ages at death 
(sample 1: dashed line, sample 2: solid line, sample 3: starred line)  
 
 





All nine graphs have the same appearance: the relationship between the death effect and the age at 
death is inverted U-shaped, thereby confirming our third hypothesis. Also our second hypothesis 
passes the test with flying colours: the death effect is indeed negative if an artist dies at a young age. 
This negative impact decreases with increasing age at death, and the death effect completely 
disappears - depending on the specification - between the age of 63 and 75. If the artist dies after that 
critical age, the reputation effect is dominated by the scarcity effect and the death effect becomes 
positive. The death effect is at a maximum for an age at death between 83 and 88 years and amounts to 
11%-14%. At greater ages at death, the effect appears to decrease again, and for some of the estimates 
we even obtain negative values. We do, however, not want to belabour this last point because borders 
of polynomials need to be interpreted with care, especially if they are determined by a rather small 
number of data points.  
 
5.2 Quantile Regressions 
We now turn to the quantile regressions which serve as a robustness check of our OLS results. 
Moreover, they allow us to test our Hypothesis 4. As already mentioned above, we need, for 
computational reasons, to restrict the analysis to a relatively small group of artists, and we do so by 
including only those artists whose artwork has been sold more than 250 times. We report only 
regressions using 3
rd-order polynomials of the variable D-Dage since the OLS regressions have 
indicated that including higher-order polynomials has no notable effect on the estimates.
9 
                                                 
9 We have, however, checked the robustness of our results using both fourth- and fifth-order polynomials.   18
Table 3: Quantile Regressions, 3
rd - order polynomials of D-Dage 
 
 
  10% Quantile  25% Quantile  75% Quantile  90% Quantile  OLS 
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0.4276∗∗∗ 
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Table 3 shows the estimation results of the 10%, 25%, 75%, and 90% quantile regressions, as well as 
the OLS estimates for comparison. The results with respect to the death effect confirm our OLS 
estimates. For all four quantiles we obtain an inverted U-shaped relationship between the death effect 
and the age at death, the critical age at which the effects becomes positive occurring at an age of 71 or 
72. Figure 7 depicts the respective plots.  
 





The plots shown in Figure 7 indicate that the death effect is more pronounced in the upper tail of the 
distribution (75% and 90% quantile) as compared to the OLS estimates, and smaller for lower 









  0.0871  











0.07   
−1.0974*** 
  0.1206* 











0.06   
−0.0529 













  0.2351 












0.07   
−0.3382*** 
  0.6599*** 
  0.5921*** 
  0.6569*** 
  0.6067*** 
  0.4841*** 



















  0.1733** 







  1.0857*** 
−0.0066*** 












  0.1252** 







  1.1687*** 
−0.0070*** 












  0.5186*** 
  0.3388*** 






  1.4773*** 
−0.0086*** 












  0.5349*** 
  0.3085*** 






  1.5087*** 
−0.0088*** 












  0.3835*** 
  0.2261*** 






  1.2807*** 
−0.0076*** 


























Coefficients are signiﬁcant on the 10% (*), 5% (** ) and 1% (*** ) level.     20
quantiles (10% and 25%).
10 At an age at death of, for example, 65 years, the death-induced price 
decrease amounts to 14% (12%) in the 75% (90%) quantile, but only 7% (8%) in the 10% (25%) 
quantile. This corresponds well to our fourth hypothesis. Collectors buy works of potential future 
leading artist and thereby create upward pressure on the prices. If, however, the artist dies an untimely 
death, the hopes of the collectors are dashed and the prices drop. This effect is larger for great talents 
because the relationship between reputation and commercial success is highly non-linear.
11 For higher 
ages at death, the line-up of the death-induced price increases corresponds even better to the 
theoretical predictions: at an age at death of, for example, 85 years, the estimated death effects amount 
to 7%, 11%, 16% and 18% for the 10%, 25%, 75%, and 90% quantile. In interpreting these results, it 
is important to remember that we are dealing here with a sample of top achievers since we excluded all 
artists with less than 250 observations. We conjecture that the death effect would be significantly 
smaller for the excluded (less well-known) artists than the death effects identified here for the artists 
making up the bottom 10% of our sample of renowned artists. 
With respect to the remaining explanatory variables, the quantile regressions yield some qualifications 
of the OLS estimates. First, the mark-up for oil paintings is especially pronounced for highly priced 
works of art. The coefficient is roughly twice as large for the 90% quantile than for the 10% quantile. 
The same holds for works on paper. Second, a signature is more important for less valuable artwork, 
price differences amounting to 25% for the 10% quantile and only 11% for the 90% quantile. We 
conjecture that for expensive artwork authentication is possible even if a piece is not signed, while for 
cheaper artwork the signature is the only (financially viable) authentication device. This argument 
would also explain why Czujack (1997) did not find a significant signature-effect for Picasso’s works 
of art which are, as a rule, very expensive. Third, the size-effect on prices for oil paintings and 
drawings on paper does not appear to depend on quality, for prints, however, it does. Our estimates 
indicate that the size-induced price differences of prints vary positively with artistic achievement. A 
10cm increase in the height of a print yields a 38% price increase for prints created by artists in the 
10% quantile, while the corresponding increase amounts to 96% for prints by artists in the 90% 
quantile. The same holds for the width of a print. Fourth, the skyrocketing prices for late 19
th century 
and early 20
th century art are driven by high-end sales. The ratio between the estimated coefficients for 
these periods and those for the second half of the 20
th century are much higher for the 75% and 90% 
quantiles than for the 10% and 25% quantiles. Finally, prices of artwork created by deceased minor 
artists depreciate much faster than the prices of artwork created by major artists, indicating that 
changes in preferences and taste cannot do much harm to artwork that is considered to be a top-
achievement of a period even if the respective style does not anymore agree with current tastes.  
 
 
                                                 
10 We do not report the estimates for the median quantile, because they do not differ significantly from the OLS 
estimates. 
11 The classic study on superstars is Rosen (1981).   21
6. Conclusions 
In this study we extended the theory explaining death-induced changes in art prices by acknowledging 
that demand for works of art is to a large extent driven by the respective artist’s reputation. We 
furthermore conduct a theory guided empirical test which takes into account that the direction and the 
size of the death effect depend on the artist’s age at death.  Our main theoretical contribution consists 
in demonstrating that the death effect is negative in the case of an untimely death. This result 
complements previous theoretical considerations that have focused on death-induced price increases. 
The negative death effect materializes because it takes a long time to build up a sustainable reputation 
in the global arts market. Thus, if a promising artist dies before her reputation reaches the level 
commensurate with the artistic quality of her work, the early collectors’ hopes of owning a piece of art 
that is generally recognized to represent the value that would actually be justified by the artistic 
quality, is frustrated. The prices thus decrease after the artist’s death.  
Our empirical investigation shows that the death effect is indeed negative for artists who are unlucky 
enough to die young.  It also shows that the reputation effect diminishes with increasing age at death, 
with the consequence that the traditional positive scarcity effect governs the price changes observed 
after the death of artists who die at a ripe age after having gained the reputation which they deserve. 
Our empirical results, moreover, bear out the prediction that the work of top artists is subject to more 
pronounced death effects than the work of merely accomplished artists, and the work of journeymen 
artists is even less affected.  
We derive our empirical results from a data set comprising more than 400,000 observations. Since our 
analysis of the death effect is embedded in a set of standard hedonic art price regressions, we are able 
to reconfirm many results previously derived from much smaller datasets. In particular, we use our 
large dataset to run quantile regressions which reveal that the influence of some price determinants 
varies substantially across price or quality ranges. All our results are robust with respect to various 
econometric specifications and estimation techniques. 
Our investigation has documented that reputation is a crucial determinant of art prices. Even though 
this is hardly a novel insight, it is worth emphasizing that the mechanisms underlying the death effect 
cannot be properly understood without taking the accumulation of reputation into account. The 
empirical literature has a tendency to downplay the influence of reputation because it is hard to 
measure. Future empirical research into art price formation, in general, and the death effect, in 
particular, would enormously benefit from a reputation measure which is independent of art prices or 
the length of the artists’ careers.
12  
                                                 
12 The “citation method”, i.e. counting the number of reproductions or the length of entries in art history 
textbooks, represents a promising starting point. It can, however, only be applied to a relatively small number of 
artists with a claim to superstar status. 
   22
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Appendix 1: Data Description  
 
Oil: 1 if artwork is an oil painting  
Paper: 1 if artwork is on paper  
Print: 1 if artwork is a print  
Dage: Age at death, i.e. death year – birth year if artist is dead, 0 if artist is alive  
Death: 1 if auction year equals death year, death year + 1 or death year + 2  
D-Dage (Death times Dage),  
D-DageS (D-Dage squared), D-DageT (D-Dage to the power of three), D-DageQ (D-Dage to the 
power of four) and D-DageP (D-Dage to the power of ﬁve), all divided by 1000  
TSD: Time since death, i.e. auction year – death year, if auction year > death year +2  
Signature: 1 if the work of art is signed by the artist  
Ln Price: Logarithm of the real price in US-$, using the US-All-Urban CPI (1982=100)   
Supply: Number of works of art (by the respective artist) auctioned in the respective year  
Width: Width of the work of art in metres  
Height: Height of the work of art in metres  
OilWidth (Oil times Width), OilHeight (Oil times Height), OilsWidthS (OilWidth squared),Oil-
HeightS (OilHeight squared), PaperWidth, PaperHeight, PaperWidthS, PaperHeightS, 
PrintWidth, PrintHeight ared defined corrspondingly 
CHLO (SOLO): 1 if sold at Christie’s (Sotheby’s) London  
CHNY (SONY): 1 if sold at Christie’s (Sotheby’s) New York  
CHPA (SOPA): 1 if sold at Christie’s (Sotheby’s) Paris  
CHUS (SOUS): 1 if sold at Christie’s (Sotheby’s) in the US, but not in New York  
CHEU (SOEU): 1 if sold at Christie’s (Sotheby’s) in Europe, but not in Paris or London  
NY: 1 if sold in New York, excluding Sotheby’s and Christie’s  
LO: 1 if sold in London, excluding Sotheby’s and Christie’s  
PA: 1 if sold in Paris, excluding Sotheby’s and Christie’s  
US: 1 if sold in the US, but not at Sotheby’s or Christie’s and not in New York  
EU: 1 if sold in the Europe, but not at Sotheby’s or Christie’s and not in London or Paris  
JAP: 1 if sold in Japan  
ay1980: 1 if auction year is 1980, etc.  
cdec1870: 1 if creation year is between 1870 and 1880, etc. 
cdec2000: 1 if creation year is between 2000 and 2005    24
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
The following table reports the summary statistics of our data sets. The reduced sample excludes all 
artists with less than 250 auction records. The full dataset consists of 436,308 observations, the 
reduced sample of 146,575. 
  
 
    Full Sample       Reduced Sample    
Variable   Mean   Std. Dev.   Min   Max     Mean   Std. Dev.   Min   Max  
Oil   0.589   0.492   0   1     0.414   0.493   0   1  
Paper   0.351   0.477   0   1     0.443   0.497   0   1  
Print   0.060   0.237   0   1     0.143   0.350   0   1  
Auctionyear   1996   6.647   1980  2005     1995   6.850   1980  2005  
Birthyear   1903   25.086   1820  1980     1899   22.395   1858  1961  
Deathyear   1968   20.553   1900  2005     1971   18.192   1920  2004  
Dage   75.263   13.134   18   112     77.785   12.089   28   98  
Death   0.032   0.177   0   1     0.035   0.183   0   1  
TSD   21.019   21.298   0   105     20.999   18.874   0   85  
Signature   0.881   0.323   0   1     0.877   0.328   0   1  
LnPrice   8.420   1.559   5.263  18.348     9.217   1.619   5.613  18.348  
Supply   28.042   81.990   1   831     71.275   130.638   1   831  
Width   0.628   0.424   0.01  12.7     0.570   0.405   0.01  11.13  
Height   0.607   0.396   0.01  10.16     0.554   0.369   0.02  9.01  
OilWidth   0.430   0.495   0   11.13     0.295   0.459   0   11.13  
OilHeight   0.410   0.467   0   9.22     0.282   0.427   0   7.75  
OilWidthS   0.430   1.184   0   123.877    0.298   1.151   0   123.877 
OilHeightS   0.387   0.842   0   85.008     0.262   0.688   0   60.062  
PaperWidth   0.165   0.298   0   12.7     0.196   0.296   0   6.1  
PaperHeight   0.162   0.288   0   10.16     0.191   0.282   0   9.01  
PaperWidthS   0.116   0.593   0   161.29     0.126   0.497   0   37.21  
PaperHeightS   0.109   0.481   0   103.2256    0.116   0.435   0   81.18011 
PrintWidth   0.033   0.167   0   9.75     0.078   0.244   0   9.75  
PrintHeight   0.034   0.166   0   6.43     0.081   0.243   0   6.43  
SOLO   0.059   0.236   0   1     0.094   0.293   0   1  
SONY   0.072   0.258   0   1     0.107   0.309   0   1  
SOPA   0.001   0.023   0   1     0.001   0.026   0   1  
SOUS   0.006   0.080   0   1     0.005   0.070   0   1  
SOEU   0.031   0.173   0   1     0.025   0.158   0   1  
CHLO   0.048   0.213   0   1     0.076   0.265   0   1  
CHNY   0.042   0.200   0   1     0.062   0.241   0   1  
CHPA   0.001   0.030   0   1     0.001   0.033   0   1  
CHUS   0.053   0.223   0   1     0.039   0.194   0   1  
CHEU   0.031   0.173   0   1     0.049   0.216   0   1  
NY   0.018   0.132   0   1     0.018   0.132   0   1  
LO   0.016   0.124   0   1     0.011   0.106   0   1  
PA   0.118   0.323   0   1     0.140   0.347   0   1  
US   0.040   0.196   0   1     0.015   0.120   0   1  
EU   0.466   0.499   0   1     0.357   0.479   0   1  
JAP   0.000   0.011   0   1     0.000   0.019   0   1  
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